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in turn released for shipment. The CH-47's were released on X+34, packaged, and shipped on X+37. Loading and shipment of retrograde aircraft was a professional operation allowing the ship to depart early the following day. Transfer of assets and station property continued and final coordination with respective civilian contractors was completed, with tentative date for final turnover being X+55. The contractor personnel were receptive to our needs and were in agreement with the revisions necessary due to the Group's continued operation until X+59. The turnover of mess facilities and clubs was designed to provide uninterrupted operation during the change. The Group, in the last few days of the withdrawal phase, continued to tie up loose ends so that the final close-out was accomplished with a minimum of personnel and effort. All aircraft were readied for final transfer upon termination of missions and property was ready, when vacated, for occupancy by contractor personnel. This facilitated an effortless withdrawal of personnel and final roll-up of the 11th Combat Aviation Group's mission in the Republic of Vietnam.

3. Specific: Inclusive periods were designated as follows: Pre-standdown phase 1 November 1972 thru 28 January 1973; Standdown phase 29 January thru 27 February 1973 (X+1 thru X+30); Withdrawal phase 28 February thru 14 March 1973 (X+31 thru X+45); and Roll-up phase 15 March thru 29 March 1973 (X+46 thru X+60). These increments were criteria for the Group as a whole, taking into consideration that specific units within the Group completed a combined Standdown and Withdrawal phase between X+1 and X+15.

a. Significant Organizational Activities.

(1) Pre-standdown phase.

(a) Personnel: 26 January 1973: After a period when personnel activities remained normal in all respects, the Group Adjutant and selected members of the staff received detailed guidance for implementation of OPLAN 215 at 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters. Personnel movement plans were drawn up and forwarded for approval.

(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: 11 November 1972: The last of the eleven OH-58A helicopters assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Nha Trang for turn-in. 13 November 1972: The last of the five CH-54A helicopters assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Deep Water Pier, DaNang for turn-in. 14 - 23 November 1972:

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In conjunction with Project Enhance, much of the equipment belonging to the 11th CAG was title transferred to the ARVN and VNAF. This equipment was then hand receipted back to the using units. 25 November 1972: The Group received a USARV/MACV SUPCOM message that directed that all excess equipment should be turned in through normal supply channels before the end of the calendar year.

(c) Intelligence/Security: 5 November 1972: Detailed briefings were established on a daily basis with elements of VNAF, D/17th Cavalry, 62nd Aviation Company (Corps), and the S-2 Section, 11th CAG to improve the operational effectiveness of the Nighthawk base defense mission. 16 November 1972: The S-2 Section assumed overall responsibility for the supervision of compound security, gate guards, and local national daily hires. 12 December 1972: The Assistant S-2 became the OIC of the 11th CAG TOC during the hours of darkness to increase the effectiveness of intelligence exploitation by the aircraft involved in the Nighthawk mission.

(d) Operations: 1 November 1972: At BT007653 D Troop, 17th Cavalry Nighthawk team observed three enemy personnel with weapons and packs. The team engaged resulting in three enemy KBH and one secondary explosion. Air Cavalry elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry while conducting a visual reconnaissance four miles west of Firebase Baldy (BT049387) observed and engaged an enemy command bunker resulting in three enemy KBH. 5 November 1972: An AH-1G from D Troop, 17th Cavalry was shot down during target engagement resulting in one US KIA. An OH-6A aircraft attempting to rescue the downed aircrew received intense enemy small arms fire causing light damage to the aircraft and wounding the pilot. The pilot was able to maneuver the aircraft to a secure area. A light reconnaissance team conducting operations five miles north of Dien Ban was engaged by an enemy command detonated mine resulting in one OH-6A destroyed and two US KIA. 6 November 1972: A UH-1H from the 62nd CAC was flying a naval gunfire adjustment mission in Quang Ngai province. The pilot attempted to circumnavigate a storm line to return to home station. The attempt was unsuccessful and due to a low fuel situation, the pilot was forced to execute a precautionary landing in the vicinity of BS346610 to wait for weather conditions to improve. Due to enemy activity in the area, the crew and passengers moved away from the aircraft to set up a defensive position. During the night the storm intensified, causing heavy flooding of the river area and washing the aircraft downstream.

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Radio contact was maintained with the crew during the night and pickup was accomplished the following morning by a USAF HH-53. The aircraft was not recovered. 10 November 1972: D Troop, 17th Cavalry while conducting operations three miles east of Dai Loc (AT978571), engaged and destroyed a bunker 15x20' resulting in three enemy KBH and one bunker destroyed. F Troop, 4th Cavalry engaged in enemy company-sized element (AT812998) equipped with .51 caliber weapons resulting in three enemy KBH. 15 November 1972: D Troop, 17th Cavalry's Nighthawk team located and engaged an enemy launch site destroying six 122mm rockets. F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed and engaged two T54 tanks, two Soviet armored personnel carriers, and four trucks one mile south of Qua Viet River (YD 379662). During the engagement, the team received heavy automatic weapons fire and one SA-7 was launched by enemy ground troops forcing the aircraft to depart prior to making a damage assessment of enemy forces. 19 November 1972: DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (27 122mm rockets). The 11th CAG sustained damage to two aircraft and no personnel injuries. 26 November 1972: A CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire while resupplying San Juan Hill. The aircraft sustained one hit from a .51 caliber weapon which passed through the copilot's windshield and several wiring bundles in the right forward cabin area causing an electrical failure. The aircraft commander was slightly wounded in the face and a precautionary landing was executed at Duc Pho. The aircraft was later repaired and returned to DaNang. 5 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting a reconnaissance mission west of Duc Pho (BS302359) observed an enemy command bunker containing 10 personnel. The team engaged destroying the bunker and 10 KBH. 6 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry received small arms fire while conducting a reconnaissance south of Dai Loc (AT965560). The ensuing engagement resulted in 10 enemy KBH. 11 December 1972: A light reconnaissance team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry, acting as a Naval Gunfire adjustment platform, directed fires resulting in 11 secondary explosions. 12 December 1972: An Air Cavalry white team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed an enemy troop concentration and two 130mm guns firing on friendly positions. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in 12 secondary explosions. 19 December 1972: Elements from F Troop, 4th Cavalry conducted a search and rescue operation in the vicinity of YD400644 for the crew of a downed Air Force OV-10. The team was successful in extracting the downed pilots and returning

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them to DaNang for medical attention. The pilot of the OV-10 died of injuries incurred in ejection and the aerial observer was treated for injuries and returned to duty. 26 December 1972: DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (19 122mm rockets) lightly damaging two CH-47C aircraft. Negative casualties were sustained. 30 December 1972: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting operations in Quang Ngai province (BT028668) engaged an area occupied by 50 to 60 enemy personnel resulting in 10 enemy KBH. 31 December 1972: A light reconnaissance team from F Troop, 4th Cavalry observed four tanks and 20 troops at YD338704. The team adjusted Naval gunfire with unknown results. 3 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry conducting reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of BT118242 observed an enemy encampment area. The team engaged resulting in 10 KBH and one enemy soldier captured by the C&C aircraft. 4 January 1973: A light reconnaissance team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry observed an enemy encampment area at AT826638. The lead OH-6A received intense small arms fire damaging the aircraft and wounding the gunner. The aircraft was able to return to DaNang and seek medical aid for the wounded crewmember. 6 January 1973: A light reconnaissance team conducting a bomb damage assessment of a B-52 strike (YD298748) observed trucks moving in the area. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in five secondaries and six sustained fires. 8 January 1973: DaNang AFB received a misdirected Loran strike causing light damage to one building and one UH-1H aircraft. Six members of the 11th CAG were slightly injured with minor cuts and bruises. A UH-1H aircraft from the 62nd Aviation Company while flying in support of the Vietnamese Airborne Division was reported shot down in enemy held territory northwest of Quang Tri (vic YD3155). Field reports indicated that the aircraft was hit by small arms fire and an SA-7 missile. Negative contact was established with the crew and repeated attempts to locate the aircraft were unsuccessful. USAF aircraft participating in search and rescue efforts reported intense antiaircraft fire and numerous SA-7 firings throughout the area. The search and rescue attempt was terminated with negative results and four crewmembers and two passengers were listed as missing in action. 9 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry located and damaged a 130mm field gun. Air Force fighter bombers on station reported destroying the gun and 180 rounds of ammunition. 10 January 1973: A light observation team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry located a cache of 20 122mm rockets (AT955627). The team vectored Vietnamese ground forces into the area and the rockets were captured intact.

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13 January 1973: An OH-6A from D Troop, 17th Cavalry received heavy small arms fire in the vicinity of BT003609; the aircraft received damage and the Vietnamese advisor on board was wounded.

16 January 1973: A UH-1H from the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) conducting standardization training, sustained damage from an unknown explosive device which detonated as the aircraft terminated a pinnacle approach to Marble Mountain (BT068711). The instructor pilot made a precautionary landing in a rice paddy near the base of the pinnacle. A maintenance recovery team was dispatched to the site and the aircraft was flown to DaNang. 17 January 1973: The Nighthawk team from D Troop, 17th Cavalry discovered an enemy 122mm rocket launch site, engaged and destroyed six rockets. Enemy troops were able to launch 22 rockets which impacted on DaNang AFB resulting in negative damage or injury within the 11th CAG. 22 January 1973: Elements from D Troop, 17th Cavalry observed and engaged an enemy squad-sized element in a small village vicinity BS753382. The team destroyed three hootches and one bunker, killing four personnel and capturing one enemy soldier. 28 January 1973: Elements from F Troop, 4th Cavalry engaged targets along the Son Tra River resulting in 30 enemy KBH. The contact terminated at 0755. At 0800 hours, all armed combat activities by the 11th CAG ceased due to the provisions of the unilateral ceasefire in the Republic of Vietnam. 26 January 1973: All PCS and installation property was title transferred to ARVN and VNAF.

(2) Standdown phase - 28 January - 27 February 1973:

(a) Personnel: 28 January 1973: Shipment of personnel was begun on X-Day and proceeded according to instructions received in conjunction with the implementation of OPLAN 215. 15 February 1973: The Morning Reports of F Troop, 4th Cavalry and D Troop, 17th Cavalry were zeroed. All of the personnel from these units had been either shipped out of country, transferred to the Joint Military Commission or the ICCS, or assigned to the HQ 11th CAG.

(b) Equipment retrograde/transfer: 28 January 1973: D/17 Cavalry ceased combat operations and prepared to retrograde all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company. D/17 was informed of a requirement to maintain five AH-1G Cobra gunships on strip alert for an indefinite period. Two of the gunships would be provided by F/4th Cavalry with crews provided by D/17. All other AH-1G Cobras were prepared for retrograde. F/4th Cavalry ceased combat operations and

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prepared to retrograde all AH-1G Cobra gunships and all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company. 142nd Transportation Company issued final SOP's to all units for the turn-in and retrograde of all aviation equipment. 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) continued their normal mission load and assumed responsibility for providing maintenance support for the UH-1H helicopters to be utilized by the ICCS and the JMC. 1 February 1973: 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) turned in one UH-1H aircraft to 1st Air Division, VNAF. F/4 Cavalry completed the turn-in of all OH-6A and AH-1G aircraft (with the exception of the two AH-1G Cobras which remained on strip alert). D/17 completed the turn-in of six AH-1G and seven OH-6A helicopters and the PLL of UH-1H parts plus all parts for the OH-6A and AH-1G. The 11th Aviation Maintenance Officer instructed 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) that all avionics command consoles would remain on board and be turned in with the aircraft. 3 February 1973: The remaining UH-1H aircraft belonging to D/17 Cavalry Troop, F/4th Cavalry Troop, and the 142nd Transportation Company were laterally transferred to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps). This represented a total of 10 UH-1H aircraft. The 11th CAG had a total of 33 UH-1H aircraft on hand. All of these were assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) and were to be utilized in the following manner: 19 for 62nd operations, eight under operational control of the Four Party Joint Military Commission, and six under the operational control of the International Commission for Control and Supervision. One CH-47C was turned over to the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS. 5 February 1973: One CH-47C was turned into the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS. 10 February 1973: F/4th Cavalry Troop completed turn in of all equipment and after auditing, destroyed their property books. 15 February 1973: 519th Medical Detachment completed turn-in of all accountable property. 277th S&S Battalion audited their property books, confirmed all zero balances, and destroyed the books. D/17 completed turn-in of all accountable property and, after auditing, destroyed their property books. 20 February 1973: Because of a gradual reduction in the mission requirement for UH-1H aircraft, two UH-1H's were turned in to VNAF. Two CH-47C aircraft were turned in to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde. 22 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) completed the turn-in of all PLL stock to the 142nd Transportation Company. 23 February 1973: The last increment of the Group's basic load of ammunition was turned in

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to the ARVN ASP #511 in DaNang. 26 February 1973: One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF. 27 February 1973: One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF. RECAP: During the standdown phase, the Group closed the property books of the 519th Medical Detachment, the 321st Airfield Detachment (Divisional), D Troop, 17th Cavalry, and F Troop, 4th Cavalry. Twelve UH-1H aircraft were turned over to the 1st Air Division VNAF; and four CH-47C helicopters, 18 OH-6A and 17 AH-1G helicopters to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde to CONUS. During this period, Group aircraft strength went from 84 to 33.

(c) Intelligence/Security: 28 January 1973: The S-2 Section conducted a survey of all units in the 11th CAG to determine the volume of classified material which would require shipment with the unit records and submitted requests for sufficient records shipment containers to ship all required material. Plans were implemented to arrange for a security platoon to handle security for the 11th CAG compound and the CONUS Evac point at Deep Water Pier. 2 February 1973: S-2 arranged for additional liaison with FRAC G-2 to provide rapid update to the current enemy situation. This was necessary to compensate for a lack of information about current tactical situations. ARVN sources were very reluctant about forwarding information which was required for pilot briefing. 3 February 1973: S-2, having overall responsibility for physical security, implemented plans to release as many local national employees, both housemaids and daily laborers, as rapidly as possible contingent upon the pace of troop withdrawals. 27 February 1973: The S-2, acting on instructions received from the Military Region I "Assistance in Kind" custodian, terminated the employment of daily hires, instructed the compound gate guards that no daily hire personnel were to be allowed on the compound, and submitted all AIK financial data records for audit.

(d) Operations: 28 January 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, received fragmentation damage from incoming rockets while on Orange Pad at Quang Ngai (vic BS649737). The aircraft sustained seven hits with negative casualties. Upon inspection, it was determined that only light damage had been sustained and the aircraft was flown back to DaNang for replacement. UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, while flying in support of CORDS, received moderate small arms fire (vic BS742525). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft continued its

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mission. 29 January 1973: The U-21A section was relieved from attachment to the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps). 30 January 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15795, flying in support of the 3rd ARVN Division received light small arms fire (vic BT055515). Negative hits or casualties were taken and the mission was completed. UH-1H aircraft, number 68-16122, while flying for the Quang Ngai Province Senior Advisor received intense small arms fire (vic BS557900). After landing at Binh Son (vic BS601921) and inspecting the aircraft and crew, it was found that the PSA, COL Truman R. Bowman had been lightly wounded in both arms. The aircraft sustained 15 hits and was determined not airworthy. COL Bowman returned to Quang Ngai city by vehicle and a CH-47C aircraft was dispatched from DaNang to recover the UH-1H.

1 February 1973: Three enemy rockets struck the vicinity of Duc Pho (vic BS812318) while UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, was parked. Negative damage was inflicted to the aircraft or crew and the mission was completed. 2 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, while flying for CORDS, received intense small arms fire (vic AT935837). Negative damage or casualties were sustained and the aircraft completed its mission. 3 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15947, while flying for the 1st ARVN Division, received light small arms fire (vic AT935837). The aircraft sustained one hit in the left drive shaft access panel on the tail boom section. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed. 4 February 1973: Due to a change of command within FRAC, the requirements for a DCG aircraft was eliminated. CH-47C aircraft, number 67-18495, while on a mission for the 2nd ARVN Division to LZ Stinson, received light small arms fire (vic BS555815). The aircraft sustained one hit through the forward green blade. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed. 5 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft took over the FRAC shuttle-bus requirements from CH-47C aircraft.

8 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15671, while supporting FRAC, received small arms fire (vic BS735523). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft completed the mission. 10 February 1973: UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15674, while supporting the 2nd ARVN Division, received light small arms fire (vic BS790400). The aircraft sustained one hit in the leading edge of the main rotor blade with negative casualties. The mission was flown to completion. 12 February 1973: Two CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, were dispatched to Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to transport, under the direction of JMC representatives, NVA and Viet Cong POW's to some pre-determined location to the north. The pilots were briefed at Phu Bai and stood by until the mission was cancelled at 1900.

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13 February 1973: All excess navigational maps were turned over to LTC Hahn, USAF-AFAT, for transfer to VNAF. 14 February 1973: Two CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, transported 100 NVA and Viet Cong POW's from Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to Camp Evans (YD541348). The POW's were then trucked from Camp Evans to the exchange point. 16 February 1973: 62nd operations received a warning order for "Operation HOMECOMING". The mission called for 10 UH-1H aircraft and one CH-47C aircraft. Steps were taken to comply with the requirements of the warning order. 17 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the requirements of furnishing aircraft support for the Marine Division Senior Advisor, 1st ARVN Division Senior Advisor, and the 3rd ARVN Division Senior Advisor. 20 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the commitment of providing a UH-1H aircraft for the FRAC shuttle-bus run. 25 February 1973: The 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) was relieved from the commitment of providing two UH-1H aircraft in support of CORDS.

(e) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property: 1 February 1973: F Troop, 4th Cavalry completed the transfer of the installation at Tan My Island. The island, with all installed property and equipment, was turned over to the 1st ARVN Division.

(3) Withdrawal Phase (X+31 thru X+45 - 28 February thru 14 March 1973).

(a) Personnel: 2 March 1973: In accordance with a message received from USARV/MACV SUPCOM, all shipment of personnel was halted until further notice. 5 March 1973: Due to favorable action on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in their commitment to release US POW's, shipment of personnel was resumed. Shipment rosters were prepared to provide personnel movement schedules which would satisfy two alternate plans as they would affect Group strength requirements. One plan reflected a requirement that the Group maintain sufficient assets to support the Operation HOMECOMING effort until X+59; the other plan would relieve us of this commitment on X+45. All movement of personnel during the withdrawal phase are linked to an as yet unknown decision which will determine the necessary strength for the period from X+46 thru X+59. Plans were made to transfer all personnel remaining in the Group after X+45 to the morning report of the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) on X+45, 14 March.

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(b) Equipment retrograde/turnover: 11 March 1973: The Camp Swampy area was released to the VNAF at 1700 after all personnel, military and civilian under the control of the 142nd Transportation Company had moved to the Camp Gimlet compound. 12 March 1973: Current plans call for the property on hand in the Camp Gimlet compound to be picked up on the hand receipt of US contractor personnel who will remain in that compound.

(c) Intelligence/security: During the withdrawal phase, each unit consolidated its personnel into fewer and fewer quarters to allow the buildings to be inventoried and sealed. This allowed the units to discharge many of their housemaids and cut down on the number of local nationals with access to the compound. As each unit shipped its personnel and equipment, the S-2 Section conducted counterintelligence inspections to insure that all classified material and official material had been destroyed or turned over to proper authorities. The Custodian of Classified Material in each unit was required to account for the disposition of all classified material before he was allowed to outprocess. 12 March 1973: All Secret documents remaining in the Secret register were released for shipment.

(d) Operations: An AC-119 Stinger gunship with six Vietnamese and five USAF crewmembers executed successive missed approaches at DaNang due to bad weather. Low fuel forced the crew to abandon ship over the South China Sea in conditions of heavy fog. The 11th CAG Group Commander, in a UH-1H operated as the Air Mission Commander for the rescue effort, directing a CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company (Corps) and personally rescuing two VNAF crewmembers. The end result was five USAF personnel and five VNAF personnel rescued. One Vietnamese crewman drowned. 3 March 1973: The 11th CAG was relieved from all CH-47C commitments and the aircraft were prepared for turn-in.

(e) Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property: During the withdrawal phase, plans were implemented to turn Gimlet compound on DaNang AFB over to US contractor personnel. These contractors would hand receipt the buildings, installation property, and PCS equipment directly from the VNAF.

(4) Roll-up Phase (X+46 thru X+60, 15 - 29 March 1973): The roll-up phase was scheduled to begin with the redeployment of the 11th Combat Aviation Group Colors on 16 March 1973. BHC

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morning report was drawn down to two entries, CPT Frank Leggio and CSM Richard Kegriss who carried the Colors, the morning report, unit history file, and other memorabilia to HQ USAREUR. On 11 March 1973, the 321st Signal Detachment and the 519th Medical Detachment zeroed their morning reports. The 142nd Transportation Company zeroed out its morning report on 15 March 1973. The Group Commander, remaining personnel of the Group staff, and needed personnel from the deactivated units were transferred to the 62nd Corps Aviation Company. Although greatly consolidated, command and staff relationship remained essentially the same through an ever decreasing workload. The daily missions stabilized at five UH-1H aircraft in support of the First Regional Assistance Command. The Operation HOMECOMING commitment remained at 11 aircraft with crews plus nominal administrative and logistic support. The 62nd CAC had 16 UH-1H aircraft remaining, all of which had been transferred to VNAF and hand receipted back to the company. This phase was scheduled to begin with 120 personnel; however, due to the shipping freeze announced on 11 March 1973, 257 personnel remained assigned. In accordance with instructions from the Army Support Element, MR I, all personnel initiated individual outprocessing.

b. Commander's Comments on Lessons Learned.

(1) Pre-standdown phase:

(a) Observation: The follow-up urinalysis program IAW USARV Reg 600-10 became ineffective for several reasons. Due to a lack of transportation, the results of samples forwarded to Saigon from the unit were not available for 10-12 days. The 95th Evacuation Hospital terminated follow-up urinalysis program and provisions were not made for the establishment of a back-up program. Evaluation: In an environment where a great deal of priority is placed on a test such as the drug testing program, provisions must be made to support it. Our unit needed to receive the results in a more timely manner so that actions could be initiated for those who were confirmed abusers. Recommendation: Transportation must be made available to subordinate units for the purpose of providing priority shipment of urine samples between widely dispersed points. It is very difficult for subordinate units to make these types of arrangements, and it puts them in the position of begging space on flights. It further results in an uneconomical use of manpower

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in an area that isn't even authorized one person on a Group TO&E. Higher headquarters also should have published a specific letter of instruction to outline procedures to be followed at the time the 95th Evac Hospital ceased to function as a follow-up urinalysis center. Command Action: Our drug personnel took the initiative to meet courier and passenger flights at the airfield to insure that samples were shipped. We also made arrangements for the 11th CAG dispensary to collect samples to forward to the appropriate medical facility in Saigon. The 11th CAG Drug Abuse Officer also notified his counterpart at G-1 First Aviation Brigade, to make him aware of the problems.

(b) Observation : At times recommendations for awards required an excessive length of time at HQ First Aviation Brigade for boarding action before they were returned to the unit. There were also many instances where awards were lost in the administrative process after they left this headquarters. Due to the inherent time lag, the fact that an award had been lost did not manifest itself until five or six weeks after submission. Evaluation: This unit needed a more expeditious method of receiving approval of awards. Initially, when an award was taking an inordinate amount of time, this unit needed to evaluate where the bottleneck existed. This unit had a very limited means of monitoring the date that awards were received by this headquarters, which didn't provide any information about the length of time each recommendation took to clear headquarters. Evaluations disclosed that awards were generally misplaced or lost en route from the CAG to Brigade. Recommendation: Recommend that higher headquarters expedite the processing of awards and place firmer controls on an award once it arrives at their location. At a minimum, they should log the date of arrival and the date departed and keep a location listed for the whereabouts of each award at all times. Command Action: This unit instituted stringent controls on award recommendations and began a card file system which monitored the award from the time that it was received until it had been approved or disapproved by higher headquarters. This at least enabled this headquarters to fix the blame on the loss of an award recommendation. It was also insured that this unit maintained a complete file copy of each award that it processed so that it could make true copies of the recommendations that were lost elsewhere. The Brigade AG was also notified as these problems surfaced.

(c) Observation: There was a considerable amount of personnel turbulence and personnel shortage in all areas.

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This period was characterized by minimum personnel staffing and continually operating at lower skill levels than would be considered prudent under optimum conditions. Evaluation: The Group was continually plagued by the curtailment of US forces in RVN. Curtailments came into effect periodically slashing manning levels with very little consideration being given to critical skill areas. A considerable percentage of aviators were required to fly more than the recommended number of hours after approval of the Flight Surgeon because there was a shortage of aviators in the Group. Very few new enlisted personnel arrived with any experience, even though most were school trained. This required that massive OJT programs be established to maintain an effective and safe aviation maintenance program. Trying to man an Aviation Group in a combat zone without the proper number of experienced personnel is a venture into an area of possible catastrophe. The safety of crew and passengers for every flight should be foremost in the minds of everyone at every level of command. When requesting personnel with this in mind, the replacements are no longer numbers but become meaningful players in the key mission of providing safe effective flight hours for supported units. Recommendation: Recommend that higher headquarters emphasize the criticality of having highly motivated, well trained individuals in aviation units. Also each higher headquarters must make a diligent effort to evaluate the quality of replacements. There is a tendency to manage Army personnel quantitatively rather than qualitatively. This often results in an imbalance of experience from unit to unit. More consideration should be given to the fact that in a combat zone or any high hour flying program, it will be necessary to operate aviation units in shifts if the mission is to be performed adequately. There are also the numerous housekeeping and security functions that must be performed and since no augmentation is provided for this, those people must come from within an already overtasked unit. Keeping these considerations in mind, movement should be made toward a higher manning level or housekeeping and security functions should be taken away from units and be relegated to lower skilled individuals assigned for this purpose. The number of personnel should be increased to insure at least two full eight to ten hour working shifts can be maintained for unit operations. Command Action: This CAG tried to place personnel in the best position to benefit the Group. As new personnel arrived, each man was interviewed individually to ascertain his experience level and any special skills he might have. Then, based on each unit's needs, this unit tried to spread out experience equitably

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so that everyone would benefit. Higher headquarters was kept advised of personnel status so that they could assist in maintaining adequate levels of skilled personnel.

(d) Observation: Defense of an installation against indirect fire weapons is a mission which requires maximum flexibility and the highest degree of cooperation between all available installation defense elements. Evaluation: In an effort to increase the effectiveness of Nighthawk base defense operations, the 11th CAG, during the previous reporting period, had arranged for the S-2 section to have access to special intelligence information from the DaNang SSO office, and established a daily briefing for Nighthawk crews, AC-119 stinger gunship crews, USAF intelligence officers, VNAF Nighthawk crews, and operations elements. With the continual decrease in the aviation assets available for this critical mission, efforts were directed toward increased flexibility and quick response to enemy activities. Due to the increase in intelligence resources available, and the perishable nature of much of the information gathered about enemy activities in the DaNang rocket belt, new methods of directing the Nighthawk operation for maximum effectiveness and shock had to be devised. Nighthawk helicopter crews tended to concentrate their efforts in areas of historical VC and NVA activity and thus allowed the enemy to gain an advantage by shifting his areas of operation. With the limited assets which could be dedicated to the Nighthawk operation, it was impossible to cover the 380 square kilometers which make up the area from which rockets and similar indirect fire weapons may be employed against DaNang Air Base. Recommendations: (1) That the Assistant S-2 take over supervision of the 11th CAG tactical operations center during the hours of darkness so that intelligence information from SSO, the USAF intelligence staff, the 3rd ARVN Division, and other sources could be effectively evaluated and passed immediately to the Nighthawk crews in flight to increase our flexibility and quick response capabilities; (2) that sweep patterns in the DaNang area be limited to the area three kilometers on either side of the line circling the base that represents the maximum effective range of the 122mm rocket, unless intelligence indicates that there will be activity in some other part of the area on any particular night; (3) that maximum use be made of AC-119 stinger gunships and VNAF UH-1 assets to provide more continuous coverage during the hours of darkness; (4) that, during the periods of high threat, the Nighthawk team be relieved on station by the first light team provided by D/17th Cavalry;

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and (5) that a limited program be established to include military personnel from other elements of the intelligence and base defense teams in the crews of the Nighthawk missions to provide an increased awareness of the value of accurate information and the need for close cooperation between all base defense elements.
Command Action: All recommendations listed above were instituted by the 11th CAG.

(e) Observation: The most common problem that has manifested itself in the Forward Supply Point during the period has been the inability to establish rapid communications between the Forward Supply Point and the Central DSSA in Saigon.
Evaluation: Due to the lack of the automatic data processing capability, the Forward Supply Point had to do everything in the manual mode. This would have not been a major problem had it not been for the fact that with the loss of air support (no U-21's from the 1st Avn Bde and no USAF SMAR flights), both sending and receiving NORS requests and paper work required as much as seven days.
Recommendation: Either ADP systems must be maintained or the SMAR (aircraft) capability retained in the future, if rapid replacement of parts and disposition of major shipments is to be accomplished smoothly.
Command Action: In an attempt to shorten the time span, a system of calling the DSSA twice a day was set up. Also, the FRAC U-21 was used as frequently as possible.

(f) Observations and Evaluations: Due to the lack of military personnel, a daily physical inventory of tools and equipment was not practical. Although the military has maintained the primary hand receipt through the unit PBO, the "hands-on" maintenance and control of the property has been by the civilian contractor. Although no major losses have occurred under this system, it is not an adequate method of maintaining physical control over the equipment. Since the civilians have the need for the equipment, they should also have the direct responsibility of inventorying and maintaining it.
Recommendations: When a civilian contractor totally accepted all "hands-on" maintenance with the military maintaining a supervisory, quality assurance role, the contractor should also be allowed to accept the needed equipment as a hand receipt holder. It is recommended that the site supervisor sign for the equipment and then delegate his responsibility by sub-hand receipting the individual shop sets, tool cribs, and tool boxes to the "lead man" of the respective sections.

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(g) Observation: Life Support Equipment maintenance is not provided by any unit in the Army. Evaluation: While the Project Manager for Life Support Equipment has provided a number of fine and adequate items of survival equipment, there was no one assigned or trained to repair the equipment. Flootation equipment was a typical example. Upon inspection of the Survival Kit, Individual Overwater (FSN 8465-973-1863 LIN U7286) that had been carried on this unit's aircraft, it was discovered that each CO2 inflation bottle was still packed in a cardboard box and not fitted to the life raft. This was the way that the kit was issued through supply channels. No one knew how, or was technically qualified to inspect and maintain this item. Another example was that more than 50% of the Life Preservers, Underarm (FSN 4220-630-8714) units checked did not function or had cuts and holes worn in the inflation wings. By the standards of other services, some of these units were overdue time change retirement from the service. A careful check of AR 611-201 will show that repair of Life Support Equipment is not a part of the job description or training of any MOS in the United States Army. TM 55-8465-206-13, Maintenance of Army Survival Kits, has been published. This TM-55 series manual would indicate that these functions should be performed within Transportation Corps Aircraft Maintenance units. Current TO&E's do not provide personnel. Recommendations: (1) That appropriate modifications be made to AR 611-201 (possibly to MOS 43E, Parachute Rigger) to establish the responsibility for LSE repair; (2) the LSE repairmen be trained for this work (possibly by other service schools); and (3) that TO&E's be written to provide necessary personnel and equipment. Command Action: Recommendations have been forwarded to higher headquarters.

(h) Observation: There are civilian institutions in Military Region I where US Army personnel from the 11th CAG could provide voluntary assistance to needy Vietnamese people. Evaluation: There are numerous areas in close proximity to the 11th CAG where medical, economic and social assistance to the Vietnamese people is inadequate. Recommendation: That the officers and men of the 11th CAG take advantage of every opportunity to meet and work with the Vietnamese -- building goodwill and understanding between the people of the United States and Vietnam. Command Action: (1) On numerous occasions, elements of the 11th CAG have provided both the Crescent Beach and the Sacred Heart orphanages with excess/unserviceable equipment such as plywood, nails, blankets, beds and pillows; (2) gifts

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of food and building materials were furnished to the directors of the leper colony at Crescent Beach after a sapper attack had destroyed five of their wards; (3) the "Shoe-shine Boys", an organization to assist homeless street boys, was supported by gifts of beds, mattresses, plywood, light fixtures, paint and other building materials. Personnel from the 11th CAG spent their free time assisting in the construction of a home in DaNang City for those orphans of the street; (4) each flight surgeon assigned to the CAG conducted a vigorous campaign of Med-Cap efforts, not only among the Vietnamese employees of the 11th CAG but also among the local orphanages and hospitals; (5) at Tan My Island, the location of F/4th Cav, medical treatment was given to the families of local villagers. The Cav Troop also conducted air/sea rescue efforts to rescue local fishermen from the water when their boats would capsize in the frequent heavy seas, and contributed supplies money and assistance for local schools and orphanages; (6) numerous functions were sponsored by the officers and men of the Group to promote better understanding and goodwill between the Vietnamese people and US forces; Christmas and Thanksgiving parties for the children and families of the local Vietnamese employees and informal social functions for the commanders and staffs of local Vietnamese Army and Air Force units; and (7) the chaplain of the 11th CAG actively publicized the plight of the orphans in DaNang and, with the commander's encouragement, arranged for those members of this command who wished to do so, to adopt Vietnamese children.

(2) Standdown phase:

(a) Observation: No major problems were experienced by this unit during the standdown phase. Four days advance notice of the standdown allowed this unit to expedite all personnel actions and suspense correspondence. This advance notice also enabled the personnel to ship their hold baggage in advance and was further facilitated by the relaxing of the regulation requiring individuals to have PCS orders before shipping their baggage. A minor problem arose with the requirement for all personnel to wear khakis on the flight to CONUS. Brass insignia and belts with brass buckles were not in the supply system, nor were they available at the Post Exchange. This required enlisted personnel to pay out of their own pockets for items that should have been government issue at concessions operated by local nationals. This unit was informed of this requirement only two days in advance of the first shipment of personnel.

Recommendation: Recommend that the uniform requirement be given in advance to the units to allow for uniform accessories to be

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made readily available to all personnel through normal supply channels.

(b) Observation: No provisions for centralized control of physical security had been made, and physical security rapidly became critical after the ceasefire. Evaluation: The requirement for maintaining adequate physical security fell into two areas. The first was the requirement to protect classified information and to deny the enemy information about current and projected operations. The second was the requirement to safeguard government supplies and equipment, and the personal belongings of military personnel. Recommendations: (1) That in addition to normal S-2 activities for providing supervision of the security of all classified material and encouraging unit programs to educate military personnel about the need for security of personal belongings and requirements for safeguarding classified defense information, the S-2 section expand its activities in the physical security field; (2) that the S-2 section assume overall supervision of the operations of the security forces, direct the deployment of guards, and establish operating procedures for the gates, controlling access to 11th CAG areas; (3) that the Assistant S-2 assume custody of the "Assistance in Kind" daily laborer fund and insure that adequate supervision is provided for local nationals working on the compounds belonging to the 11th CAG. Command Action: All recommendations listed above were instituted by the CAG.

(c) Observation and Evaluation: The transfer of Shop Platoon equipment to VNAF contained several inherent problems. Although the USARV OPLAN was followed as to inventorying and preparing equipment for transfer by the 142nd Trans Co (ADS), the VNAF gave little cooperation towards an efficient turn-in. A schedule was established as to time and place of turn-in, but the VNAF failed to show with their representatives at the pre-arranged time. This disregard for scheduling resulted in a loss of manpower and equipment hours needed for other phases of the standdown mission; i.e., flatbed trailers and 5-ton tractors. Recommendation: The primary inventory phase of shop platoon equipment should have been done jointly by US Military and VNAF representatives, thus relieving the time factor of reinventory just prior to transfer. It is recommended that VNAF appoint more personnel for handling and accepting of transfer items. Apparently, only one VNAF officer was able to sign for this equipment and he was never present at prearranged times.

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(d) Observation: The 11th CAG was responsible for the retrograde of 25 AH-1G, 17 OH-6A, and seven CH-47C helicopters from Vietnam via the Deep Water Pier at DaNang.

Evaluation: This unit had the responsibility for preparing all AH-1G, OH-6A, and CH-47C helicopters in MR I for retrograde via ship from the Deep Water Pier in DaNang. Some of the factors to be considered were how much of the preparation would be handled by the owning unit prior to turn-in to this unit and how to transport the aircraft from their location at DaNang AFB to the Deep Water Pier. Additionally, it was necessary to coordinate very closely with the higher headquarters during the operation.

Command Action: (1) The aircraft were prepared by having the units thoroughly clean the aircraft prior to turn-in. The 142nd TC then completed the preparation of the aircraft for shipment; i.e., preserving engines, removing rotor blades, sealing the aircraft, etc. The only significant problem encountered was a requirement from higher headquarters for information from the aircraft log books after the aircraft had been prepared. This necessitated opening the aircraft to get to the log books and then resealing the aircraft. Another problem was that the units did not remove the explosive cartridges from the AH-1G rocket pod mounts in all cases. This required reopening the barrier paper covering the AH-1G stub wings on a few aircraft and then resealing them. (2) the OH-6A aircraft was transported to the Deep Water Pier in the Sea Land vans that they were to be shipped in and presented no specific problems other than securing the helicopters in the vans. Two helicopters were placed in each van by placing them in a slight angle so that their tail booms were alongside each other. The helicopters were held in place by means of 2x4 bracing nailed to the floor of the van alongside and over the helicopter skid tubes. The wooden boxes containing the OH-6A main rotor blades were secured by padding them with cushioning material and strapping them to the floor of the van beneath the helicopter using salvage cargo tiedown straps. The straps were nailed to the floor of the van at each end. Shipping the OH-6A helicopter in Sea Land vans facilitated ease of transportation and loading and unloading at the ports of embarkation and debarkation as well as increasing the protection from corrosion during shipment. (3) The AH-1G helicopters were prepared for shipment at DaNang AFB and transported to the Deep Water Pier on flatbed trailers when the preparation was complete. Sufficient low-boy trailers were not available, necessitating the use of regular flatbed trailers. It was

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necessary to lift some overhead wires along the way to allow the helicopters to pass underneath. Even so, a few long hanging wires were ripped down during the movement. Use of low-boy trailers would have prevented this. The AH-1G main rotor blades were shipped in standard AH-1G main rotor blade shipping boxes and presented no unusual problems. One helicopter was damaged when the truck upon which it was loaded pulled forward while the crane that was used to lift the helicopter onto the trailer was still attached to the helicopter lifting eye. As the truck pulled forward, the helicopter slid aft along the trailer until the rear of the helicopter skids lodged in the wheel well cutouts on the trailer, causing the helicopter to rock backwards breaking the "stinger" and damaging the tail boom when it struck the rear edge of the trailer bed. The helicopter transmission mounts and skid attaching points may possibly have been damaged as well.

(4) The CH-47 helicopters were flown to the Deep Water Pier and final preparations were performed on each aircraft at that location, except for one unflyable aircraft that was transported to Deep Water Pier by surface means. Final preparation of the aircraft at the Deep Water Pier required the dispatch of men and equipment to that point, but presented no particular problems. The CH-47 rotor blade boxes were used to ship most of the rotor blades. Those blades, for which boxes could not be found, were secured in racks inside the helicopters. The CH-47 retrograde operation went smoothly with no unusual problems.

Recommendations: (1) That the requirement for information from aircraft log books be determined prior to sealing the aircraft for final preparation; (2) the preparing unit should insure that all explosives are removed prior to sealing the aircraft; (3) that the Sea/Land van method of shipment be used for shipping OH-6A helicopters in the future; and (4) that AH-1G helicopters be transported on low-boy trailers instead of regular flatbed trailers.

(3) Roll-up phase:

(a) With the exception of the frequent changes in projected shipping schedules, the roll-up phase was free of significant problems. VNAF and the various civilian contractors were cooperative and the turnover of real property and property book items was completed. The remaining items were transferred in a few hours.

(b) The Security Platoon did a satisfactory job of keeping the theft of government and personal equipment at an

APPENDIX 1 (11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP) to Annex B to USARV/
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acceptable level. ASE HQ at Camp Horn experienced considerable problems and tasked the Group with 20 men in order to form a security detachment.

(c) Once personnel were released for shipment, no problems were experienced in drawing down to the projected level of 76 officers and men remaining on X+59. Effective on X+55, the 62nd CAC was scheduled to zero out its morning report with the remaining personnel being assigned TDY to FRAC at no cost to the government.

(d) With the release of all missions and commitments on X+59, a long, proud history of Army Aviation in Military Region I of the Republic of Vietnam came to an end.

- Tab: A - Four Party Special Aviation Detachment
B - ICCS Flight Detachment-MR I
C - 11th CAG Organizational Structure
D - Organization of 11th CAG
E - 11th CAG Command and Staff Positions
F - Awards and Decorations
G - Authorized and Assigned Strength - 28 Jan 73
H - Operational Statistics
I - Aircraft Vulnerability
J - Aircraft Authorized and On-hand

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment) to
Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and lessons learned by the Four Party Special Aviation Detachment.

2. General: This report covers the activities of the JMC Aviation Detachments from its activation on 28 January 1973 until completion of activities and deactivation of the detachment.

a. Significant Organization Activities:

(1) The FPJMC Aviation support package was formed on 272400H January 1973, and consisted of eight UH-1H aircraft, one OIC, 16 pilots, eight crew chiefs, one NCOIC, and one Technical Inspector. A 23-man NHA civilian work force was authorized, but was never identified by name or separated from the 142nd Transportation Company manpower pool for economy of force reasons. On X+7, the detachment was further augmented by the addition of a trained Maintenance Officer. As JMC Teams were designated for Regions I and II, separate aviation detachments had to be established to augment each team. The two aircraft in support of JMC Region I remained, out of the necessity for support, under the control of the larger Region II team.

(2) During the period 28 January to 13 March 1973 the Region I and II Aviation Detachments flew 525 hours, carried 140 passengers, and transported 10 tons of cargo. On two occasions seven out of the total eight aircraft were tasked for daily missions; however, the average daily commitment was five aircraft per day.

(3) The maintenance teams that supported the detachment, though hampered by the scarcity of selected parts, were able to complete five periodic examinations, and several major component changes. Despite the fact that no blade hour restrictions were placed on the missions and no ceilings were placed on the number of aircraft that could be committed on a daily basis, the detachment was able to maintain an availability rate of 81%. This was due largely to the outstanding maintenance support provided by the 142nd TC shop teams.

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

b. Commander's Observations and Recommendations: Few major problems were experienced by the detachment during the operational period. The major problems experienced by the JMC as a whole were not associated with the aviation aspects but in the coordination between the four parties themselves. All missions assigned to the Aviation Detachment received a timely response and experienced only minor difficulties during the conduct of the mission. The detachment recorded one firing incident during the period which resulted in negative damage to the aircraft or injuries to the crew or passengers. This is significant because numerous hours were flown into contested areas or territory owned by the PRG/DRV. Unfortunately, the FPJMC never fully deployed into Region I or II; consequently, most of the flying hours were in support of routine administration missions and the aircraft were never fully utilized for their stated purpose.

3. a. Specific:

24 January 1973: At 2400 hrs the FPJMC Special Flight Detachment was formed and prepared for missions to commence on notification of the ceasefire.

28 January 1973: The first mission in support of FPJMC was flown to transport initial personnel to the Region I headquarters in Hue.

5 February 1973: The Aviation Detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang AFB to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

7 February 1973: (1) The Aviation Detachment was augmented by the addition of a maintenance officer to aid the team in required daily and scheduled maintenance.

(2) The Aviation Detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang Air Base to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

11 February 1973: The Aviation Detachment inserted two PRG representatives into Tra My (old Hau Duc) without incident.

12 February 1973: Aircraft from the JMC Detachment transported PRG representatives from Tra My to the FPJMC compound located in DaNang.

TAB A (Four Party Special Aviation Detachment) to Appendix 1
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

30-31 March 1973: The FPJMC was scheduled to be
disbanded on this date with all aircraft turned over to the
VNAF and all personnel transferred to shipping points for
transfer to CONUS.

b. Commander's Observations on Lessons Learned: None.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To summarize the activation, operation, and standdown of the ICCS Flight Detachment in MR I.

2. General:

a. Significant Organization Activities:

(1) Organizational phase (28 January 1973): Upon notification of the ceasefire on 28 January 1973, the ICCS Flight Detachment was formed from the personnel and equipment assets of the 11th CAG. Major Zane K. Rector (XO, 11th CAG) was designated as the detachment commander.

(2) Operational phase (29 January to 20 March 1973): The ICCS Flight Detachment conducted transportation and resupply for the ICCS delegations in Regions I and II (MR I).

(3) Standdown-Withdrawal-Roll-up Phase (20 - 27 March 1973): The ICCS Flight Detachment was relieved of flying responsibilities by Air America on 27 March. Assigned personnel were withdrawn from RVN and equipment was turned over to PA&E and Air America.

b. Command Observation and Recommendations:

(1) Organizational phase (28 January 1973).

(2) Operation phase (29 January to 20 March 1973):
Observation: ICCS personnel were not aware of the aviation detachment's availability to them in MR I.
Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should have been briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

Observation: Poor communication existed between operations personnel in Region I and Region II causing a mis-utilization of aircraft by the ICCS Teams.

Recommendation: Aviation support be routed through one operations office where missions can be properly scheduled to prevent waste of aircraft blade time.

Observation: Aircraft were being used to fly to areas where adequate and secure ground transportation was available.

Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should first attempt to move personnel and supplies by road convoy unless time is of the essence.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

Observation: ICCS personnel made no apparent attempt to observe ground activities between their regional and field locations when they traveled by aircraft.

Recommendation: That ICCS personnel should use road convoys as the primary means of transporting supplies and personnel. This would present more opportunities to observe the actions of the PRG, DRV, RVAF and US personnel from a vantage point.

(3) Standdown-Withdrawal-Roll-up phase (20 - 27 March 1973): Observation: Air America continued to postpone the acceptance of the ICCS mission in MR I. The initial transfer of missions was to take place on X+30. It was postponed to X+37, X+44, and was finally scheduled for X+59. This caused unnecessary hardship on assigned personnel and their families who needed a definite date to prepare for the move to their next assignment. Recommendation: That Air America be required to reassign aircraft and pilots from their missions in other areas to support the ICCS mission in Vietnam.

3. Specific:

a. Significant Activity:

28 January 1973: ICCS Detachment formed with 13 officers, eight EM, and six UH-1H's all from 11th CAG assets. Maintenance support was provided by a 23-man NHA contract team under the 142nd TC. Personnel were assigned to 62nd Avn Co.

31 January 1973: ICCS quartering party from Saigon arrived to inspect DaNang and Hue facilities. Party was briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

5 February 1973: ICCS teams arrived from Saigon and deployed to DaNang and Hue. Coordination meeting held with operations officers from DaNang, Hue Regional Headquarters, and the Aviation Detachment.

6 February 1973: First mission flown in support of ICCS.

14 - 22 February 1973: ICCS flown to Quang Tri to observe daily prisoner exchange.

28 February 1973: ICCS aircraft received ground fire northwest of Hoi An (coord BT085625) wounding the pilot. ICCS members from Canada and Indonesia were aboard.

TAB B (ICCS Flight Detachment - MR I) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

29 February 1973: All ICCS aircraft were grounded until further notice on orders from Saigon ICCS Headquarters. Exceptions required written approval.

9 March 1973: ICCS team taken to Gio Linh field site. First time to cross north of Thach Han River.

27 March 1973: Aircraft transferred to Air America.

27 - 29 March 1973: Personnel departed RVN.

b. Commander's Comments:

Evaluation: During the operations phase, it became apparent that the delegations from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland knew very little about the utilization of helicopters in supporting their mission.

Observation: The "CHIP" personnel were using aircraft for short flights between secure areas where less expensive ground transportation was available. Aircraft were also being flown with only a few personnel on board.

Recommendation: CHIP personnel should be briefed on the expense and effective use of blade hours when employing aircraft.

Command Action: The detachment commander and operations officer conducted extensive discussions about aircraft utilization with operations personnel in both ICCS Regions I and II.

TAB C (11th CAG Organizational Structure) to Appendix 1 to
Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO, 96349

HHC, 11TH CAG
APO, 96349

62ND AVIATION COMPANY (CORPS)
APO, 96349

519TH MEDICAL DETACHMENT
APO, 96349


321ST AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)

F TROOP, 4TH AIR CAVALRY
APO, 96349

D TROOP, 17TH AIR CAVALRY
APO, 96349

142ND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
APO, 96349

TAB D (Organization of 11th CAG) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report



TAB E (11th CAG Command and Staff Positions) to Appendix 1
to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>UNIT OR STAFF POSITION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>NAME</u>
GROUP COMMANDER	14 JUN 72 - 28 MAR 73	STANLEY D. CASS 523-44-2707, LTC, FA
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	27 APR 72 - 28 MAR 73	ZANE K. RECTOR 413-54-2705, MAJ, FA
S-1	20 OCT 72 - 28 MAR 73	FRANK J. LEGGIO, JR. 144-38-2617, CPT, TC
S-2	1 APR 72 - 10 NOV 72	RICHARD W. PEDERSON 141-40-3799, CPT, FA
	10 NOV 72 - 28 MAR 73	WELDON O. SPENCER 450-70-9673, CPT, MI
S-3	18 OCT 72 - 28 JAN 73	JOHN P. KENNEDY 029-30-6274, MAJ, AR
	28 JAN 73 - 28 MAR 73	WILBER W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ, AR
S-4	1 SEP 72 - 28 MAR 73	JOE E. PARISH 254-54-2908, MAJ, IN
CO, 62ND AVIATION CO (CORPS)	6 OCT 72 - 28 MAR 73	OLLIE C. CRADDOCK 261-54-6273, MAJ, FA
CO, F TROOP, 4TH CAV	10 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73	KERMIT E. LARSON 463-62-9607, MAJ, AR
CO, D TROOP, 17TH CAV	3 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73	WILBERT W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ, AR

TAB F (Awards and Decorations) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

SILVER STAR	0
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS	5
BRONZE STAR	21
AIR MEDAL	116
ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL	32
TOTAL	174

TAB G (Authorized and Assigned Strength - 28 Jan 73) to
 Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>WO</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSD</u>
HHC, 11TH CAG	16	16	0	2	24	32	93	50
62ND Avn Co	25	30	60	24	298	175	383	229
142ND Trans Co	6	6	6	3	151	62	163	71
D Troop, 17TH Cav	19	20	31	22	216	180	266	222
F Troop, 4TH Cav	19	18	31	19	216	152	266	189
321ST AD(D)	1	1	0	0	7	8	15	9
519TH Med	1	1	0	0	8	8	9	9
 TOTALS	 87	 90	 128	 70	 920	 617	 1195	 779

TAB H (Operational Statistics) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

HOURS FLOWN:	NOVEMBER	4,081
	DECEMBER	4,196
	JANUARY	4,289
	FEBRUARY	1,406
CUMULATIVE HOURS:		30,245
SORTIES FLOWN:		45,741
TROOPS LIFTED:		15,218
CARGO LIFTED: (TONS)		2,518
ENEMY KBH:		90
STRUCTURES DAMAGED:		206
STRUCTURES DESTROYED:		322
SAMPANS DAMAGED:		19
SAMPANS DESTROYED:		120
VEHICLES DAMAGED:		0
VEHICLES DESTROYED:		0
TANKS DAMAGED:		0
TANKS DESTROYED:		0

TAB I (Aircraft Vulnerability) to Appendix 1 to Annex B
to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SHOT * AT</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>SHOT DOWN</u>
NOVEMBER	51	15	3
DECEMBER	55	9	4
JANUARY	25	11	1
FEBRUARY	5	2	0
MARCH	2	1	0

TAB J (Aircraft Authorized and On Hand) to Appendix 1 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

	UH-1H		AH-1G		OH-6A		CH-47	
	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H	AUTH	O/H
62ND AVN CO	20	21					6	6
D TROOP, 17TH CAV	10	10	10	9	9	7		
F TROOP, 4TH CAV	8	9	9	8	9	9		
142ND TRANS CO	2	2						

APPENDIX 2 (12th Combat Aviation Group) to ANNEX B to USARV/
MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown of 12th Combat Aviation Group during the period 1 November 1972 through 14 March 1973.

2. General:

a. Section 1: Significant Organization Activities.

(1) Pre-X-Day Phase: During the period 1 November 1972 to 29 March 1973 the 12th Combat Aviation Group continued to provide army aviation support to the Commander, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC), Headquarters, MACV and USARV. Group assets included two air cavalry troops, F Troop, 8th and F Troop, 9th US Air Cavalry stationed at Bien Hoa Army, which were OPCON to Cdr, TRAC, with the primary mission of providing security for the key installations and US personnel in Military Region III. Their mission ended on 28 January 1973 commensurate with the cease fire. Additional Group assets included the Command Aircraft Company which provided U-21 fixed wing support for all MR's and Headquarters, MACV/USARV. The 59th Corps Aviation Company was also assigned to Group and supported Headquarters TRAC, USARV and MACV with utility and command and control helicopters. An additional major unit of Group was the 388th Transportation Company with the responsibility for providing all in-country general support and back-up direct support aircraft maintenance. Subsequent to the ceasefire, the 388th provided the major effort for retrograde of army aircraft from Vietnam. The last aircraft to be retrograded by surface means was taken out of Newport dock on 3 March 1973.

The outstanding efforts of 12th Group during this reporting period were evidenced by the numerous significant achievements. The combined average monthly flying hours of the two air cavalry units, flown while accomplishing their primary mission, exceeded all other air cavalry averages in Vietnam. The aircraft loss rate was the lowest in Vietnam even though the combat activity in MR III had increased sharply. The Command Aircraft Company completed one accident free year of U-21 fixed wing support for all of Vietnam which included VII transportation for the highest ranking US personnel to visit Vietnam as well as neighboring countries.

An additional unit of this group was the 312th Aviation Detachment (Divisional). The 312th Commander was responsible for operating Hotel 3, which was the major heliport in Vietnam, and Lassiter Heliport at Bien Hoa Air Base, the home of both F/8 and F/9 Air Cavalry Troops.

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Subsequent to receipt of the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215, actions were initiated to prepare for standdown of this Group and its units. This phase was marked by enthusiasm and optimism on the part of all staff sections and unit headquarters. Plans were formulated and information was disseminated to unit levels. The process of reviewing and revising plans resulted in numerous changes in planning guidance for some units. As the cease-fire efforts continued and it became evident that peace would not occur in 1972, units resumed their missions and waited for final planning to be accomplished. Suspense dates were established and plans were formulated for the timely submission of OER's, PER's, awards, funds dissolution, and personnel strengths. As guidance was published and changes noted, units were contacted to insure their understanding and compliance.

Significant reorganization that occurred included the formation of special aviation teams to support the Four Party Commission and the International Commission for Control and Supervision. This selection was primarily based upon aviator retainability and qualifications. Guidelines and suspenses for the termination of funds were also established. Rosters of personnel assigned and those pending orders were prepared during the initial stages of the pre-standdown and forwarded in order to assist in zeroing morning reports. A list of mission essential personnel for extension beyond normal DEROS was submitted to USARV for approval. This was limited to key personnel in critical slots. Although activities were conducted on a continuing basis, the frequency of changes and actions resulting therefrom consumed considerable time on the part of administrative personnel at all levels of command.

During this first period, units were instructed to turn-in all excess equipment in anticipation of the cease fire. The S-4 section conducted inspections in the areas of motor maintenance, arms room, mess hall, and supply operations. Safety inspections were conducted at Lassiter's rearm and POL points. All unit property books were audited for the scheduled Annual General Inspection and/or standdown.

The 12th CAG was preparing for an Annual General Inspection scheduled for the end of February. The overall posture of the group was improved by the pre-AGI inspections and assistance visits to the subordinate units. Equipment was in fair shape but there were problems with the "time lag" encountered in the offshore supply system. Equipment was earmarked for support of the aircraft retrograde mission and put in good condition. Coordination was made with Vinnell Corp and PA&E for top priority on all projects once X-Day arrived.

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Since planning originally commenced in mid-October there was no major problem during this time. Units were briefed on standdown procedures and copies of Annex F to USARV OPLAN 183 were furnished to all units. PERT charts were drawn up and used as a management tool to facilitate an orderly standdown. Personnel turbulence made it necessary for some units to change key standdown officers which could have been avoided by astute personnel management.

The initial reaction to the promised ceasefire was enthusiasm and hard work in the effort to accomplish a fast withdrawal of US forces. However, the subsequent turn of events, when the war continued, saw a definite abatement in total productivity. All functional areas of military activity suffered from a reluctance to turn from peace preparations back to prosecution of the war. Even the promising start toward standdown began to suffer as morale took a downswing. The formulation of plans for standdown and the dissemination of information to troop units slowed, as did unit reaction. The resumption of mission tasks was accomplished as the final plans for standdown were completed.

Based upon data obtained from Brigade OPLAN 215, skeletal plans were outlined to coordinate the intelligence collection and counterintelligence functions as effected by depleted resources and personnel security - debriefing requirements. The disposition of unit files and security equipment was considered in the light of assumptions concerning time phased mission reduction. Document security, communication security, and personnel security measures were planned in accordance with the proposed troop and mission reduction.

The 12th CAG Signal Section was actively engaged in maintaining communications to include an effective distribution system between 12th CAG Headquarters and subordinate units. The telephone communications from Saigon to Bien Hoa and Plantation went steadily downhill because this system was no longer under US control.

During the period from 1 November 1972 to 14 March 1973, plans and contingencies were formulated for the standdown of all aviation maintenance facilities in MR III. A plan for continued maintenance support for US Army aircraft in MR III subsequent to the standdown of the military maintenance units was established and implemented. Plans and contingencies were also formulated for the retrograde of 153 aircraft from Newport dock facility as well as the transfer of all remaining UH-1H aircraft in MR III to GVN (VNAF).

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(2) Standdown Phase: Upon official notification of the ceasefire, plans had to be updated and certain inadequacies of these plans were identified. Special aviation mission teams were organized; however, no provision for the administrative and support requirements had been made. Immediate re-assignment of personnel with the MOS's 71B/H (clerical and administrative), 94P (cooks), and 76Y (armor/unit supply) caused problems for subordinate units. It not only created hardships for the individuals involved but also caused units to reassign personnel internally. Additionally, with the shortage of these MOS's throughout the Group, further reassignment between units was required in order to assist each unit to standdown in an orderly fashion. Most of the reassignments levied on individual units could have been anticipated and implemented in the current OPLAN.

The Unit Fund was turned in to the Central Post Fund on X+10 with no discrepancies. Pertinent files and records were boxed and forwarded to AG Publications as per instructions.

F/8, F/9 and 129th Medical Detachment commenced standdown on X-Day and were completed by X+15. The standdown was accomplished in a timely and orderly fashion. The remaining units in group continued to turn-in excess equipment and made coordination for the turn over of PC&S property. The army installation at Bien Hoa was turned over the ARVN on X+16. The LOI's published for standdown were followed by all units and proved to be a definite assistance. Sufficient transportation, other than TO&E was made available through Transportation Motor Pool (TMP). The Newport Plan was successfully put into operation for retrograding aircraft. Update information from the 1st Aviation Brigade OPLAN 215 was disseminated and the group standdown plan was updated and briefed to all units. The units located at Bien Hoa ceased tactical operations and started standdown immediately while all other units continued their missions. Title transfer of selected TO&E property had been effected previously and was hand receipted back to US units. PC&S property at Bien Hoa was turned over to ARVN Units.

Notification of the ceasefire order brought back the enthusiasm seen initially in October. Minor changes in the OPLAN were implemented and units commenced immediate shipment and processing of troops. Special Mission Teams were organized and briefed. The sudden increase in personnel security requirements presented no particular problems. Staff coordination and adequate planning provided for effective personnel security processing. The planned termination of intelligence processing

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and dissemination caused some problems in providing for Special Action Teams. This was compounded by the cut-off of incoming material by higher headquarters. Although planning was adequate and timely for the most part, the uncertainties in contingency planning resulted in holding certain assets, notably secure voice radio and security containers, beyond the planned turn in date. The screening and disposition of files was uncomplicated though changes in the cut-off date occurred frequently.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: To assist in a planned withdrawal, release rosters were submitted. However, because of changes in unit missions the actual withdrawal did not coincide with the rosters and resulted in delays while orders were being published. This, in turn, caused delays in outprocessing. This phase of the ceasefire concerned not only the withdrawal of troops but also the reassignment of personnel within Vietnam to meet the needs of special teams.

Intelligence files and logs were closed. Where necessary, mission-essential documents were transferred permanently to 1st Aviation Brigade. All files were disposed of in accordance with **standdown** plans. Staff sections reduced personnel strength where practical. Some difficulties were encountered as planning deficiencies appeared. Again, uncertainty in the contingency area caused a slow-down in personnel clearances, turn-in of files and disposal of classified material and references.

Mission requirements were reevaluated and aviation assets were adjusted accordingly. The OPSUM Report was terminated on 1 March 1973. All other reports were continued. The Group assumed the responsibility for providing all aviation support in MR III for "Operation HOMECOMING". This added responsibility was thoroughly coordinated with 1st Aviation Brigade and plans were formulated for this Group to maintain a special aviation staff to control aviation support in MR III after X+45. The majority of the communication equipment was turned-in during this period. Radio communications with the F Troops, 8th and 9th Cav was terminated on X+14. During the withdrawal phase (20 Feb - 1 Mar 73) COMSEC records were shipped to the custodians of the gaining unit in CONUS.

All safety files and records were turned over to 1st Aviation Brigade. Group and Special Detachments retained the responsibility for aircraft accident investigations until standdown. The 12th CAG and its subordinate units safety record of 7.5% was a "milestone" in aviation safety. The accident rate for RVN was 13.8%. This low rate was brought about by experienced and

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safety conscious commanders and all support personnel.

(4) Roll-up Phase: The final phase of the ceasefire was concerned with the establishment of internal controls to insure unit deactivation standdown and final morning report submission. A skeleton staff was established for movement to Brigade in order to finalize all unit administrative actions.

During this phase, the final disposition of files and references was accomplished; the transfer of personnel security functions to the 1st Aviation Brigade was made along with the closing of document control logs. As the units cleared their areas, the exit security inspection was completed and final reports were forwarded to 1st Aviation Brigade. A methodology for security debriefing of personnel was implemented as they processed out of their units into the Camp Alpha transshipment area. All mission requirements were combined and sufficient aviation assets were transferred to the CAG to support all remaining aircraft requirements. Command Aircraft Company (CAC) and 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters were the only aviation units in MR III remaining after X+45. All reports after X+45 were forwarded from CAC to the Group staff which was reduced to seven personnel and remained until X+59 to provide aviation support for MR III.

b. Section 2: Commander's comments on lessons learned:
Robley W. Davis Jr., LTC, IN.

(1) Special Teams Formation

(a) Observation: The actual composition of special aviation teams was not adequate to enable them to perform both their mission and meet team administrative requirements.

(b) Evaluation: The requirement was to assign only aviators and crewchiefs to each special aviation team; however, it became apparent that each team needed operations and administrative personnel to maintain flight records and orders. Units had to be tasked to provide the additional support personnel; however, they could not be assigned to the teams due to team strength limitations.

(c) Recommendation: Special aviation teams be formed as separate detachments with the complete capability of performing operations and related administrative functions.

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(2) Orders for Special Teams:

(a) Observation: Members of special aviation teams were not reassigned promptly to a controlling headquarters or organization.

(b) Evaluation: When the special teams were formed, plans had not been completed to reassign team members to a gaining unit. This created confusion among the team members as well as their parent units. Morning reports did not accurately reflect unit strengths since members to be transferred were actually present for duty with their teams. The air cavalry troops were unable to zero out morning reports in a timely manner because team members were selected from their assets and had not been reassigned. In addition some confusion existed as to rating schemes and the administration of military justice.

(c) Recommendation: Personnel on special teams be immediately reassigned to a controlling headquarters that is scheduled to maintain a morning report throughout the entire period of utilization.

(3) Destruction of Unclassified Material:

(a) Observation: Adequate instructions were not published for the destruction of unclassified material.

(b) Evaluation: Although there were adequate instructions for the boxing and shipment of classified and unclassified files, no plans or guidance was received for the destruction of such material as regulations, manuals, and forms. There were inadequate facilities at Tan Son Nhut to effectively destroy the abundance of such material. Numerous phone calls and coordination with PA&E, the fire department, and other activities were required to locate a suitable facility for burning large quantities of unclassified material.

(c) Recommendation: Plans must be made for the large scale destruction of unclassified material in the final stages of unit standdown and withdrawal.

(4) Files and Security Containers:

(a) Observation: Uncertainty caused by added missions and responsibilities caused a slowdown in files disposition. This in turn delayed turnover of security containers.

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(b) Evaluation: As previously mentioned, the delay in the proposed ceasefire caused decreased productivity at all levels, a psychological reaction to disappointment sometimes referred to as "stand-downitis". Staff planning and more particularly, staff coordination suffered because of this phenomenon. Decisions were slow incoming and even slower in dissemination as each level of the hierarchy added its own "safety factor". Thus, at Group level, files were held beyond a time of any practical usefulness. The resultant, all-out purge and disposition when this static situation was overtaken by the third change of suspense date, caused a day-long stoppage in other activity. The chain reaction result was a holdup in transfer of security containers. Not a large problem, nevertheless it was time consuming and counter-productive.

(c) Recommendation: That early planning and initiation for and disposition of historical and general files be required at all staff levels.

(5) Closing of Funds:

(a) Observation: More command supervision at unit level was required to insure proper closing of funds and availability of auditing officers.

(b) Evaluation: The terminal audits of funds were conducted by persons with little or no prior knowledge of funds management or administrative procedures. This created a training problem; other problems resulted from auditing officers not initiating their audits promptly through failure to notify their respective fund custodians of the date for final audit.

(c) Recommendation: Auditors should be carefully selected and immediately initiate terminal audit procedures.

(6) Maps:

(a) Observation: The USARV/MACV SUPCOM Map depot began disposition of assets early in the standdown. New supplies were not obtained.

(b) Evaluation: An immediate need for maps arose with the formation of the Special Action Teams by 12th Combat Aviation Group. This need was met out of stock-on-hand; however, the on-hand supply was seriously depleted. Contingency planning required additional map supplies which could not be readily obtained through normal channels.

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(c) Recommendation: That normal supply channels remain open and functioning as long as US Forces require support in the combat area.

(7) PCS Orders:

(a) Observation: The shipment of personnel available for release was slowed by the lack of orders.

(b) Evaluation: Although assignment instructions were received, orders were not published by X+10 as originally indicated but continued through X+20. This often prevented units from releasing those persons scheduled for shipment and meant changing shipping dates by as much as three weeks. During the second increment, this prevented the units from maintaining their shipment rates and caused a delay in scheduling. In addition to creating problems for the various headquarters, it also created a hardship for individuals and their families.

(c) Recommendation: Orders be published as scheduled and in accordance with shipping lists submitted by individual units.

(8) Intelligence Information:

(a) Observation: Military Intelligence collection assets began standdown almost immediately upon X-Day. The collection responsibility was to be taken over by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces agencies who would continue operations and reporting. This office was not in a position to assess the workability of such a plan and only observed that the quality and quantity of intelligence information received through normal channels was inadequate.

(b) Recommendation: That US Intelligence collection and processing agencies continue support to US Forces until they exit the combat area.

- Tab A - 12th CAG Army Aviation Element
- B - 12th CAG Air Tow Detachment
- C - 312th Aviation Detachment-Divisional
- D - 12th CAG Command Aircraft Company
- E - 59th Corps Aviation Company
- F - 388th Transportation Company
- G - F Troop, 8th Cavalry, 12th CAG
- H - F Troop, 9th Cavalry, 12th CAG
- I - 12th CAG Special Aviation Teams
- J - FPJMC Aviation Detachment-RW-Regions V, VII & HQ

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities and planning involved in the standdown and close out of the 12th Combat Aviation Group Army Aviation Element (AAE) at the Third Regional Assistance Command. (TRAC).
2. General: During the period 1 November 1972 to 29 January 1973, plans and contingencies were formulated for the stand-down and close-out of the Third Regional Assistance Command Army Aviation Element. (TRAC AAE).

TRAC AAE was composed of a chief of AAE, two Assistant Aviation Staff Officers, and two enlisted clerks. Located at TRAC Hq, Plantation, RVN, AAE was an integral part of the TRAC Staff. The AAE was a subordinate element of the 12th Group and served as the operative element for the 12th Group commander in his function as the TRAC Aviation Officer. AAE came under the staff supervision of the S-3, 12th Group.

The primary mission of AAE was to serve as **advisors** for employment of Army aviation assets for the TRAC Commander and his staff and to supervise and coordinate all of the Army aviation assets and support in MR III.

Basically aviation support for Military Region III consisted of administrative helicopter support for the 11 Provinces in the region as well as support for three division advisory teams, the Ranger Brigade Advisory team, and the Armor Brigade Advisory team.

The primary mission of AAE, however, was mission planning and coordination for the two Air Cavalry troops and the Air TOW Detachment which were under the operational control of the Commander, TRAC.

This was accomplished by face to face coordination with Division and Province advisory teams throughout the Military Region and formulating Visual Reconnaissance plans based on their recommendations. These plans were then presented to the TRAC Commander and staff for approval or modification. Once approved, the missions were given to the Air Cavalry by AAE along with available intelligence gathered from the TRAC G-2. This planning and mission coordination for the Air Cavalry was the bulk of the workload for AAE and it formed a constant series of plans, operations, and updates to maintain a current picture of enemy activity along with the other intelligence gathering agencies.

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

During the period of this report, the enemy heightened and expanded his activity throughout the military region in an effort to gain additional territory prior to the expected ceasefire. This created additional planning requirements because it was necessary to maintain a watch on centers of enemy activity while at the same time attempting to make a systematic covering of the other areas in the military region. This was accomplished by maintaining close coordination with all of the elements in the military region and reacting to important intelligence trends.

AAE was also responsible for coordination of CH-47 support within MR III for the resupply of U.S. assets and the recovery of downed aircraft. MR III had no organic CH-47 assets and AAE was responsible for arranging CH-47 support from MR IV when this support was required.

Finally, AAE maintained the net control station for both secure voice and FM radio for all of the elements within 12th Group.

A. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activity

(1) Pre-X-Day: From the period 1 November 1972 to 27 January 1973 plans were drawn for the standdown of AAE. It was realized that as of X-Day tactical operations would cease and that the coordination of administrative missions could be assumed by the S-3 section of 12th Group. As a result it was decided that AAE would be stood down on X+1 and that all remaining missions and reports would be delegated to the S-3 section.

(2) Standdown Phase: Standdown was accomplished between 1200 hours 28 January 1973 and 1200 hours 29 January 1973. No significant problems were encountered and personnel strength was adequate to accomplish the mission.

B. Section 2: Observations and Recommendations:

(1) Pre-X-Day: No specific observations or recommendations. Plans were disseminated from both TRAC and 12th Group in adequate time to facilitate planning and no major problems were encountered.

(2) Standdown Phase: Observation: Units of the command as well as elements within the Military Region required

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additional CH-47 support after notification of a ceasefire because of turn-in requirements. This caused a strain on an already over-taxed support system.

Recommendation: That a CH-47 be assigned as a group asset until X+10 to be used as necessary to turn in aircraft and equipment.

3. SPECIFIC:

A. Section 1:

(1) Pre-X-Day: During the Pre-X-Day Phase there were no significant activities with reference to the standdown plans; however, there was increased activity in the military region. During this period the Air Cavalry concentrated their activity along the major infiltration routes in Tay Ninh Province and the Saigon River corridor. Numerous enemy fortified areas were found and targeted for TacAir and B-52 strikes. B-52 targeting was accomplished by coordination between the Air Cavalry, AAE, and the G-2 Air and G-3 Air on the TRAC staff. Once a strike was recommended and executed, the Air Cavalry normally conducted a bomb damage assessment of the target area. Approximately 50% of the B-52 strikes in MR III during this report period were either recommended by the Air Cavalry or targeted by the TRAC staff as a result of Air Cavalry reconnaissance in conjunction with other intelligence reports.

The Air TOW Detachment working in conjunction with the Air Cavalry averaged engaging in nine targets a month during this period and had confirmed destruction of one tank, two APC's, and eight trucks. AAE controlled the disposition of the Air TOW Detachment and habitually assigned them to operate with the Air Cavalry in any area that would have a possible armor threat.

During this period, because of the increased work load, the liaison visits to the advisory teams at Province and Division was somewhat curtailed. Although some visits were still made, the majority of the mission planning was a result of intelligence reports and maintaining reconnaissance along the infiltration routes.

This effort by the Air Cavalry, coordinated by AAE, was successful in that the Commander, TRAC was kept abreast of

TAB A (12th CAG Army Aviation Element) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

the current enemy activity in the region and was better able to advise the III Corps Commander on methods of dealing with the enemy threat.

(2) Standdown Phase: Upon notification of the ceasefire, AAE began the actual standdown procedures. All personnel assigned were briefed by the Chief, AAE as to the time-table and their specific duties.

Tactical operations were halted and the radio nets were closed. The radio equipment was turned in to the appropriate agencies. All continuing operational functions and report functions were assumed by the S-3 section on X+1. All activities normally in contact with AAE for aviation support were notified of the standdown and informed to process any requests through the S-3 section. All activities at the Plantation installation were closed out and all personnel and equipment moved to the S-3 section, 12th Group on X+1.

B. Section 2: Commander's comments - Robert E. Weathersby, MAJ, IN.

(1) Pre-X-Day: No significant observations or recommendations.

(2) Standdown Phase: All standdown activities went smoothly and with a minimum of coordination problems. The entire standdown of AAE took less than 24 hours and all of the remaining required functions of AAE were absorbed by the S-3 Section of 12th Group on X+1.

The only problem area to be noted was the problem of CH-47 support in MR III. Due to the requirements in MR IV and the International Commission for Control and Supervision and the Joint Military Commission, CH-47 support became very restricted immediately after X-Day. It was recommended that early coordination be effected through Vietnamese Air Force channels to insure CH-47 support for aircraft recovery after the standdown of U.S. CH-47 assets.

TAB B (12th CAG Air Tow Detachment) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

1. Purpose: To report significant activities involved in the standdown and the close out of the Air TOW Detachment.

2. General: The First Combat Aerial TOW Detachment commenced operations with the 12th Combat Aviation Group on 1 November 1972. A significant armor threat had developed in MR III and the TOW Detachment was employed to counter the threat. The TOW Detachment consisted of two NUH-1B helicopters with the XM-26 missile system installed. Six pilots and three enlisted men were assigned to the Detachment. In addition, four technical representatives from Hughes Aircraft Company provided the technical know-how to maintain the weapon systems. The personnel were assigned to HHC 12th Combat Aviation Group, attached to F Troop 9th Cavalry and received missions from Army Aviation Element, TRAC. The aircraft were employed daily with both cavalry troops that were operating in an armor threat area. The aircraft were not only used to engage targets, but were also employed in a reconnaissance role to further enhance the Air Cavalry mission. One tank, two APC's, six trucks, and numerous other point targets were engaged and destroyed by the TOW Detachment.

a. Section 1: Significant Organizational Activities

(1) Pre-standdown phase: Plans were formulated for the orderly turn-in of aircraft and withdrawal of personnel.

(2) Standdown phase: The retrograde of two NUH-1B helicopters was completed on 30 January 1973 (X+2). Standdown was completed in a timely and orderly fashion.

b. Section 2: Commander's Observations and Recommendations: Karl B. Hill, Jr, CPT, AR.

Standdown phase: Contingencies for equipment not organic to the unit, such as fork lifts and flat bed trucks, should be made available to insure an orderly withdrawal of equipment and to meet suspense dates established.

3. Specific:

a. Significant activities occurring in each phase as they relate in the following areas:

(1) Pre-standdown phase: Air TOW conducted normal operations in conjunction with F Troop 8th U.S. (Air) Cavalry and F Troop 9th US (Air) Cavalry). Air TOW engaged an average of

TAB B (12th CAG Air TOW Detachment) to Appendix 2 to Annex B to USARV/MACV SUPCOM After Action Report

nine (9) targets a month, resulting in the destruction of one (1) T-54 tank, two (2) armored personnel carriers, and eight (8) 2½ ton and 5 ton trucks. Plans were formulated for standdown of XM-26 system equipment and the two (2) NUH-1B helicopters.

(2) Standdown phase: On 26 January 1973 three (3) officers of the Air TOW Detachment were notified of their new assignment with the ICCS. On 20 January 1973 the officers departed the Air TOW Detachment for their new assignments. On 30 January 1973 the three (3) enlisted men departed the Air TOW Detachment en-route CONUS. In addition, three (3) civilian technical representatives from Hughes Aircraft Company departed the Air TOW Detachment on 1 February 1973. Mr. J. J. Moniz, Chief Engineer from Hughes Aircraft Company, and CPT K. B. Hill, Jr. Detachment Commander, remained until 3 February for final disposition of the XM-26 system and related equipment. On 28 January 1973 stand-down procedures commenced. On 29 January 1973 the XM-26 systems were removed from aircraft 553 and 554 - aircraft 554 was turned in for retrograde. On 30 January 1973 aircraft 553 was turned in for retrograde. Packing for XM-26 system and back up test equipment commenced. On 31 January 1973 aircraft parts were successfully turned in and an Air Force loading team started palleting the XM-26 equipment. On 1 February 1973 the Air Force load team completed palleting and the equipment was loaded upon a C-141 aircraft.

b. Section 2: Commander's comments on lessons learned, and recommendations relative to each phase and areas of concern.

(1) Pre-standdown phase: No significant recommendations or observations with regard to operational employment of air TOW. However, support of a test detachment, such as Air TOW, employed to a theater of operation, should receive much more emphasis than Air TOW did in areas of administration and logistics. Personnel assigned to Air TOW were unable to reconcile their 201 personnel records for the first 8 months of their assignment to the Detachment due to a lack of interest or knowledge from supporting administrative personnel. The Air TOW Detachment made two (2) PCS moves within RVN and were not issued orders for their moves until 2 months into the second move, at which time much confusion existed as to who belonged to whom. Upon PCS to 12th Combat Aviation Group in November 1972, the Air TOW Detachment finally experienced competent administrative support and all problems related to personnel administration were resolved. More emphasis should be established in this area by higher headquarters to ensure orderly administration of an individual's personal